Abstract. In this paper we propose a novel approach to the analysis of security protocols, using the process algebra CSP to model such protocols and verifying security properties using a combination of the FDR model checker and the PVS theorem prover. Although FDR and PVS have enjoyed success individually in this domain, each suffers from its own deficiency: the model checker is subject to state space explosion, but superior in finding attacks in a system with finite states; the theorem prover can reason about systems with massive or infinite states spaces, but requires considerable human direction. Using FDR and PVS together makes for a practical and interesting way to attack problems that would remain out of reach for either tool on its own.
Introduction
Security protocols are vital for providing secure communication and processing of information across a distributed system. However, designing such protocols is notoriously error-prone, since it is difficult to predict and allow for all the possible interactions between the parties operating on the network running the protocol.
Constructing proofs of correctness by hand can be arduous. Indeed, many convincing hand-constructed 'proofs' of correctness of protocols have been published in the literature only to be found wanting at a later date. Over the past decade, formal methods have been remarkably successful in their application to the analysis of security protocols with the emergence of some powerful verification tools.
There are essentially two approaches: model checking and theorem proving. Under a model-checking approach, a system executing the security protocol is represented as a transition system with finitely many states. The model checker then uses various efficient state exploration techniques to discover whether the system can reach a state representing a security violation. Many different model checkers have been employed in this fashion; for example, FDR [1, 2, 3] has proved to be an excellent tool for modelling and verifying safety properties such as authentication and confidentiality. One has to be extremely careful when using a model checker for such tasks, however: it is all to easy to allow the state space to become unmanageably large.
The alternative is the theorem-proving approach, in which a system and its properties are described by logical formulae, and the formal proof is established by proving theorems that state that such properties hold in the system. One successful such setup is that of the rank functions theory [4] embedded in the PVS theorem prover, which can tackle authentication properties of protocols running on networks involving arbitrarily many agents and with an arbitrarily large message space. However, even when using semi-automated (interactive) provers such as PVS or Isabelle, it is a large task to validate a complex system. For example, in the project to verify SET [5] , a e-commerce protocol, Isabelle presents the user with subgoals that are hundreds of lines long, and diagnosing a failed proof requires meticulous examination of huge formulae.
The model-checking approach is superior in finding attacks in a system with finite states, but subject to the state explosion problem; the theorem-proving approach can reason about systems with massive or infinite states spaces, but does not provide automatic verification. One natural question to ask is whether it is possible to blend the two complementary approaches in an elegant way to avoid the weaknesses of each.
There have been various lines of investigation for creating hybrid systems. For example, Cohen [6] proposes a proof method for analyzing security protocols in which safety properties are proven by ordinary first-order reasoning, and all proof is generated in an automatic verifier, TAPS. Song [7] also proposes an efficient automatic checking algorithm, Athena, which incorporates its own logic and exploits several state space reduction techniques based on an extension of the Strand Spaces Model [8] . Heather [9] develops a tool, RankAnalyser, that makes use of results [10] to construct a rank function and verify a protocol automatically. It is appropriate for verifying networks of arbitrary size, and with arbitrarily many concurrent executions of the protocol. However, the above tools are designed for analyzing a few specific properties, all of which are safety properties. Liveness properties-deadlock, nonrepudiation, denial of service, and so on-have not yet been mastered to the same degree since they must be expressed in a more complex model. We here propose the novel idea of using the process algebra CSP to describe the system executing the security protocol and the security properties to be verified, and construct the proof of correctness by using a combination of FDR and PVS.
The general approach is to start by modelling the (infinite-state) system in the CSP semantics that we have embedded into PVS, and then start to prove the theorems using PVS. In the course of constructing the proofs, we invariably encounter some subgoals involving only finite-state processes. It would take a long time to trace through the states one by one checking for correspondence in PVS, whereas FDR can verify such cases very quickly; therefore, we proceed by building these results into the PVS theory as axioms, and then proving them correct in FDR. In this way, we harness the power of the theorem prover for establishing results about an infinite-state system, whilst retaining the speed and automation of a model-checker for certain appropriate parts of the proof.
Currently, translating between the PVS syntax and the FDR syntax is done manually; however, we are making progress towards a tool to perform this translation automatically.
